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This paper is an exploratory review of various firewall philosophies, technologies, and architec
tures. Commonly used firewall technologies are described in general, including packet filtering,
proxy server, circuit-level gateway, and stateful multilayer inspection. The strengths and weak
nesses of these technologies are compared. Standard firewall architectures such as the screening
router architecture, the dual-homed host architecture, the screened host architecture, the screened
subnet architecture and their variations are examined and the pros and cons are summarized.
Issues involving firewall building in practice are addressed for a hypothetical small software de
velopment company. A few assumptions are made in order to apply the reviewed material to the
hypothetical example. Four steps in firewall building are followed. First, the network service needs
are identified. Next, the security concerns associated with these needs are analyzed. Third,
security policies are specified to address the security concerns. Last, firewall alternatives are pro
posed to implement these policies.
Although the example is hypothetical in nature, the assumptions made are relatively representa
tive of many small-to-medium-sized software development companies today with respect to fire
wall applications.
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1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Overview
In the past two decades, the fast growth of internetworking technology has been providing
individuals,
convenience.

corporate

companies,

and

government

agencies

tremendous

flexibility

and

People use their networked computer facilities to store and access private,

confidential, or business-critical data.
Being able to access information through interconnected network systems has brought many
advantages; however, it has also brought many security concerns as well.

For many business

corporations and government agencies, in fact, information security is one of the most critical. The
goals of information security are generally described as; 1) data integrity, 2) data confidentiality,
and 3) data availability (Chapman and Zwicky, 1995; Lynch and Rose, 1993). Compromises of
data in any form may have serious consequences such as invasion of privacy, incorrect or poor
decision making, sensitive information leakage, inadequate accounting, and so on (Chapman and
Zwicky, 1995; C hesw ickand Bellovin, 1994; Eckel, 1995).
Besides data security, networked hardware and software resources (e.g., servers, routers,
links, CPU, storage devices, printing facilities, operating systems, and user applications, etc.) can
be the targets of hackers as well. Attacking or illegally using hardware and software resources by
hackers was a more serious problem in the early networking days than it is today. As networked
computer hardware and software becomes ever cheaper and more affordable, this type of attack
becomes less of a concern.
Breaches of network security often take both malicious and non-malicious forms. Malicious
attacks are those intended to cause some negative impact on the target,

such as systems being

damaged by harmful viruses, systems being overloaded with pings, web sites being defaced, or
some form of espionage such as information theft, destruction, or modification.

Non-malicious

attacks are generally not intended to cause damage to the target; some examples are joyriding,
score keeping, and benign computer worms (Chapman and Zwicky, 1995).

Attacks on network

resources and information are becoming more serious as the networking community grows larger
and more people begin to access the Internet.

i

2

Certain instances that occurred in the late 80’s during the development of the Internet have
increased the public’s attention towards network security.

One such instance, of course, is the

infamous 1988 worm attack (Chapman and Zwicky, 1995; Louw and Duffy, 1992).
A formal definition for network security is hard to give. Broadly speaking, network security
refers to the capabilities that support protection of the network infrastructure against abuse and the
prevention of network users from compromising data integrity, confidentiality and availability.
Network security is intended to protect sensitive information found on devices attached to a
network by controlling access points to the information (Leinwand and Fang, 1993), assuring that
users, local or remote, are authenticated, and access to services and information is authorized
(Cooper et al, 1995; Eckel, 1995; Hunt, 1992; Miller, 1993).
For network security administrators, making their LAN safe and secure from attackers while
still keeping a connection to external networks can be a major problem.

Security management

involves identification of risks and security needs, development of security policies and assessment
of the capabilities in technical and social terms.

It involves installing and maintaining

authentication and encryption systems to ensure that remote communication circuits are adequately
protected.

It also involves technical evaluation tools for network protocol correctness and

robustness. Security management also means activity monitoring, as well as design and execution
of quick countermeasures when one or more aspects of security mechanisms is breached.
Leinwand and Fang (1993) have summarized four major steps necessary to accomplish security
management: 1) identifying what needs to be protected, 2) finding the access points, 3) designing
security mechanisms to secure these access points, and 4) maintaining and enhancing security
mechanisms.
W hile it is important to be concerned about network security, it also has to be agreed that easy
access to information and network security work at cross purposes. Networking is a compromise
between convenience and security, as enhanced security will always undermine a L A N ’s usefulness
lor authorized users.
In recent years, a wide variety of tools and techniques have been developed to help system
administrators secure their networks.

Firewalls are one of the most popular.

A firewall is an

integrated hardware/software package that resides between an internal network and one or more
external network(s). All communication between internal and external networks must go through
tlie firewall (Chapman and Zwicky, 1995; Cheswick and Bellovin, 1994; Cooper et al, 1995).
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Firewall is a general term because it does not really refer to one particular mechanism or
technology that can be used to achieve such a purpose.

Rather, it refers to a broad range of

mechanisms or technologies that can be adopted to make an internal network system secure while
still maintaining some reasonable connectivity with the outside world.
Firewalls are becoming more and more popular for sites that need security at the network
level.

Thus, it is important and useful for us to have some general understanding about die

technology.

1.2 Proposal
The goal of this paper is to gain a thorough understanding of firewall strategies and principles
by providing an exploratory review of various firewall technologies, architectures, and products.
Further, the information reviewed in the paper will be applied to address some of the network
security problems in one hypothetical situation. More specifically, the following objectives will be
achieved:
A. To describe the firewall philosophy and principles in general;
B. To review commonly used firewall technologies— what kinds of security policies each of these
technologies can enforce and their strengths and weaknesses;
C. To review standard firewall architectures and their variations— describe what kinds of network
security problems each of these architectures can address and their pros and cons;
D. To describe in general some major commercial and freeware firewall products;
E. To apply the information reviewed and present alternatives for implementing feasible firewall
mechanisms in a hypothetical small software development company.

Three steps will be

followed to achieve this objective: 1) to identify the security needs, 2) to define the security
policies that will be targeted to address these needs, and 3) as one of the many security aspects,
to determine what firewall architecture(s) and product(s) can be used to enforce these policies.
When identifying the security needs, only those that can be effectively addressed by using
firewall techniques will be focused on.

When applying the information reviewed in this

hypothetical situation, a few assumptions will be made on the network configuration (hardware
and software) and security needs in order to present some “feasible” firewall alternatives.

2. FIREWALL PHILOSOPHY AND PRINCIPLES
According to the definition given in the W ebster’s New W orld Dictionary (1988), a firew all is
“a fireproof wall to prevent the spread of fire, as from one room or compartment to the next.”
Today, this concept has been widely adopted in the internetworking world as a means of regulating
communication between networks to guard valuable network resources and to ensure information
security, often in conjunction with other forms of security measures such as authentication,
authorization, privacy enhancement, and monitoring. Specific implementations of firewalls include
packet filters, proxy servers, circuit-level gateways, and stateful multilayer inspection. These will
be described in Chapter 3.
A firewall can function as an efficient choke point for inbound and outbound network traffic
to allow and deny services based on established security policies.

It can be used to keep

meaningful traffic records between the internal and external systems. A firewall can also be used
internally to hide more critical network segments from those which are less critical. However, a
firewall cannot protect against internal threats. Further, since a firewall typically does not scan the
details of the data passing through it, it can not protect against data-oriented threats such as
viruses.
When it comes to the design and implementation of firewalls, certain philosophies and
principles apply.

2.1 Philosophy
Following the traditional firewall definition, an internal system can be protected by isolating it
from external sources where danger or “fire” can possibly originate. The fundamental purpose of
firewalls is to restrict the flow of information between networks (Figure 1). The degree of
restriction depends on how much a site relies on external services and how well it needs to be
secured from potential external threats.
There are two major security philosophies:
1) The rule o f default-deny, i.e., that which is not expressly permitted is prohibited;

4
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2)

The rule o f default-permit, i.e., that which is not expressly prohibited is permitted.

Firewalls generally follow the rule o f default-deny. It is considered much safer than the rule
o f default-permit.

One only needs to worry about those cases to be allowed (Chapman and

Zwicky, 1995; Cheswick and Bellovin, 1994; Cooper et al, 1995).

2.2 Principles
There are also some general security principles to apply for firewall design, implementation,
and evaluation. First, the number of inbound and outbound services allowed by a site should be
minimized in order to reduce the chance of a security breach of the internal network. This is called
the rule o f least privilege.
Firewall defense should have certain depth, i.e., the firewall should have multilayer defense.
If a firewall has only one layer of defense, such as a bare-bone screening router firewall or a dual
homed firewall (see Chapter 4), the whole defense collapses once the screening router or the dual
homed host is compromised, and system administrators do not even have time to respond to any

External Network(s)

—j-Internal Network

Figure 1. A firewall model shows that a firewall is a special hardware- and software-based
network security system setup between internal network and external network(s) to protect
the internal network from being harmed by external threats.

6

kind o f attacks.
Legitimate access channels by external users to internal information or resources should be
narrowed as much as possible.

As a matter of fact, the majority, if not all, of inbound and

outbound network traffic should be forced to go through a firewall or a set of firewalls that guard
internal systems. A strategically placed network firewall serves as a choke point where security
rules can be enforced and network traffic can be monitored and controlled.
A firewall should also be a dedicated system. Components, hardware or software, needed to
build a firewall should only be used to implement functionality that are solely related to security
between the internal and external systems. A firewall should never provide additional non-firewall
functionality that has nothing to do with the security between the internal and external systems. To
ensure this, a host used in a firewall generally should run a bare-bones standard or proprietary
operating system.
A firewall should also be designed and implemented so that when it fails to function properly,
it will not open the door wider for attackers than the situation with a properly functioning firewall.
Tins may mean a complete shutdown of the firewall and no network traffic, legal or illegal, will
How between the internal and external. This rule is called the fail-safe rule.

As we mentioned

earlier, firewall building generally follows the rule o f default-deny since it is safer than the rule of
default-permit. It may irritate users if one forgets to allow something needed, but it is safer than
forgetting to deny something that is potentially dangerous.
A good firewall should be as transparent as possible to the users in order to minimize the
inconvenience for insiders and to hide the existence of a firewall from outsiders.
Firewall monitoring is also a very important aspect. Monitoring will alert security personnel
when a system is compromised, will indicate the nature of the attacks, and will provide sufficient
logging information so that potential design and operational flaws in a firewall can be analyzed. A
firewall should be designed and implemented so that monitoring is carried out as automatically as
possible.
Finally, it is important to emphasize that security can only be achieved through diversified
mechanisms in a defense system. Firewalls offer some promising technical alternatives for many
types of security threats; however, a firewall will not guarantee security if other aspects of security
are neglected.

3. FIREWALL CLASSIFICATION
In this chapter, four commonly used firewall technologies are described in general, including
packet filtering, proxy servers, circuit-level gateway, and stateful multilayer inspection.

The

strengths and weaknesses of these technologies are compared.
Packet filters are mostly used to implement security policies at the network and transport
layers in the TCP/IP Reference Model. Theoretically, firewall gateways can implement security
using information at all levels of the model, although the process is typically done at the
application level (proxy servers) and sometimes at the transport layer (circuit-level gateways).
Stateful multilayer inspection, on the other hand, has become more popular in some commercial
firewall products in recent years; security is implemented by using information at all levels o f the
model.
Detailed discussions about packet filtering and proxy servers are given by Chapman and
Zwicky (1995) and by Cheswick and Bellovin (1994). Circuit-level gateways are described by
Cheswick and Bellovin (1994).

Only limited information is available on stateful multilayer

inspection.

3.1 The TCP/IP Reference Model
In order to describe the technical details of firewall components, it is necessary for us to have
some basic knowledge about the TCP/IP Reference Model, what a packet is, and how a port
works. The characteristics described here are only those relevant to firewalls.

3.1.1 Overview
M ost network systems are described using two important architectures: the Open System
Interconnection (OSI) Reference Model and the TCP/IP Reference Model. Designed to serve as a
standard to allow various open systems to communicate with each other, the OSI Reference Model
provides a seven-layer reference for protocols for interconnection of cooperative computer systems.
The TC P/IP Reference Model, on the other hand, is the traditional model used to describe the
ARPANET and its descendant, the Internet. Since most firewall concepts and theories are built
and described using the TCP/IP Reference Model, a brief review about this model is deemed
necessary.
7

According to Stevens (1994) and Tanenbaum (1996), the TCP/IP Reference Model consists
of four layers: the application layer, the transport layer, the network layer, and the data link layer1,
as shown in Figure 2. The four layers are also collectively referred to as tine protocol stack. Each
layer has its unique responsibilities and may have one or more protocols to fulfill these
responsibilities.

In general, the lower three layers are solely responsible for network

communication and they are usually implemented in the operating system. The highest layer, the
application layer, is usually a user process which handles application details.

C lien t

S erve r

A pplication L ayer

-Application layer protocol

A pplication L ayer

T ran sp o rt L ayer

■Transport layer protocol

T ran sp o rt L ayer

N e tw o rk L aye r

■Network layer protocol

N e tw o rk L aye r

D a ta Link L ayer

Link layer protocol

D ata Link L ayer

Physical Connection-

Figure 2. The four layers in the TCP/IP Network Model, also known as the protocol stack.

More specifically, the data link layer is implemented in the device drivers and in the network
interface card which handles die hardware interface to a network.

This layer usually provides

reliable communication between directly connected hosts. Reliability is often partly achieved with
a cyclic redundancy check (CRC) check on the frames being transmitted.

Commonly used

protocols at this layer include Ethernet, FDDI, and Token Ring. The network layer handles the
movement of packets around an internetwork; that is, routing is handled at this layer.

The

1 The other three layers (the presentation layer, the session layer, and the physical layer) in the OSI Reference Model
are usually insignificant in the TCP/IP context.
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protocols often used in this layer are IP, ICMP, IPX, and IGMP. The transport layer, similar to the
data link layer, provides for delivery of data passed down from the application layer of the sending
host to the transport layer of the receiving host; however, the hosts need not be directly connected.
There are two types of TCP/IP transport protocols; TCP (Transmission Control Protocol) and
UDP (User Datagram Protocol). TCP requires a connection to be established before data can be
transmitted between two hosts and thus it is a more reliable but less efficient protocol. UDP does
not require a connection at the time the data is transmitted and thus is less reliable but more
efficient. The application layer is the layer which provides end-user services such as file transfer
and e-mail. This layer does not know anything about the movement of data across the network.
For an application that runs over UDP, the application layer can also be configured to ensure the
reliability of the data. Some traditional examples of network applications are FTP (File Transfer
Protocol), SM TP (Simple Mail Transfer Protocol), SNMP (Simple Network Management
Protocol), and Telnet. A network application usually consists of two components: a client and a
server. Each component processes data according to the four layers as described above and may
have one or more protocols at each layer to communicate with its peer layer on other end of the
communication.

3.1.2 Packets
Packets are short messages sent from one host to any other hosts across network(s). They are
the fundamental units for network communication in packet-switched network systems. In the
application layer, a packet consists of pure application data. At the sending end, data is passed
down along the protocol stack. In the process, each lower layer adds a header to the upper level
packet passed down to it and forms the packet specific to that layer.
layers, each packet2 consists of two major parts— a header and a body.

Thus, in the three lower
A packet from a given

upper layer is treated as the data in the next lower layer. The whole process of adding headers layer
by layer is called encapsulation. At the receiving end, the process works the opposite way— the
headers are removed as a lower level packet travels upward along the protocol stack. This process
is called demultiplexing (Stevens, 1994).

2 Depending on the specific protocol used at a given layer, a packet may have different names, such as TCP segment,
UDP datagram, Ethernet frame, etc.
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As far as security is concerned, the header of a TCP transport layer packet provides three
useful pieces of information, the TCP source port, the TCP destination port, and the TCP flags
field, assuming an application is using TCP in this layer. In the flags field, the condition of the
ACK bit can be checked to implement some security policies.

The header of a network layer

packet contains an options field which is usually empty, however, it can be used by hackers to
attack an internal system.

3.1.3 Port
For a TCP-based or UDP-based application, in order to communicate with each other, the
client and the server each need to create an end point called a socket. Each socket includes the IP
address of the host and a 16-bit number local to that host. This 16-bit number is called a port.
Port numbers below 256 are usually reserved for standard services such as FTP, HTTP, SM TP,
SNMP, and Telnet.
For a TCP-based service, a connection has to be explicitly established between a socket at the
client end and a socket at the server end.

Some services even need multiple connections to be

established. For example, both the normal mode and passive mode FTP requires two connections
be established between the client and the server, one for command exchange and the other for the
actual file transferring. In normal mode, an FTP client first randomly allocates two ports above
1023. It uses one of the two ports to open the command channel connection with the server’s port
21 and then issues a PO R T command to tell the server the second port it uses. After receiving the
command, the server uses its port 20 to establish the data channel connection.
For UDP-based applications, a source port and a destination port need to be specified for a
UDP datagram, although no connection is required between the client and the server.

3.2 Packet Filtering
Traditionally, routers are used to determine the correct network address to which they should
forward a packet (Miller, 1995; Perlman, 1992; Stallings, 1994). Packet filtering uses a router in
a more sophisticated way. It implements security by checking the information carried in the header
of a packet. The header of a packet may contain the following information which can be used by a
packet filter: source and destination addresses, source and destination ports, the message type, and

11

so on. The widely used pieces of information include the source and destination addresses and the
well-known protocol ports.
Using packet filters to achieve security only using host addresses is not very common. Tliis is
because source addresses of incoming packets can be easily forged. Essentially, their usage for
security at this level is limited to only two forms. If an external site is considered to be unfriendly,
packet filters can be configured to disallow any connection to be established with that site. Packer
filters are also very effective for eliminating packets with forged internal addresses.
Packet filters are mostly used to achieve security at service level, although this requires that
the protocol port assignment be somewhat fixed. If a well-known service is considered unsafe, the
service can be denied by dropping all the packets with the port number associated with that service
(for instance, the use of inbound unsecured Telnet can be denied by dropping incoming packets
with destination port 23).
For a TCP connection, the very first packet sent from the client to the server does not have the
ACK bit set and all the subsequent packets will have the bit set. W ithout the request packet, the
packets of a connection can not be reassembled by either end to make the communication
meaningful. Provided that all request packets are examined with sufficient caution, subsequent
TCP packets can be allowed to flow through without too much security concerns. Thus, incoming
TCP packets with the ACK bit set can be allowed to flow into an internal system.
As we have mentioned earlier, the header of a network layer packet contain an options field
which is usually empty. Only in a source routed packet, the source route option field is used to
specify the route the packet supposed to take to its destination. The routing decision is made based
on the information provided in the source route option instead of that given in the routing table of a
router along the way. This mechanism is seldom used by system administrators except for casual
network debugging, however, it is often used by hackers to attack a host. Thus, it is also a general
filtering rule that a packet with the IP source routing option set should be dropped.
Relatively speaking, packet filtering is a simple and inexpensive way to build a firewall
because most routers can be configured to perform filtering. On the other hand, packet filtering is
a less reliable approach than other types of firewall technologies because there are many kinds of
packets and it is always easy to forget to deny some of them. To ensure that security can not be
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easily compromised, packet filters often have to be used in conjunction with other firewall
components.
Cooper et al. (1995) have summarized six steps when a packet filter is used in a firewall
architecture, whether it is used by itself or in conjunction with other firewall components. Some
examples for packet filtering rule specification are provided in Chapter 5. The six rules are:
1) Define packet filtering rules for the ports of the packet filter and store them in order of
importance. The order of the rules is critical;
2) Process a packet by parsing the headers (mostly IP, TCP, and/or UDP) and examining the
information stored in those security related fields;
3)

Check the information retrieved from the headers against the packet filtering rules

according to the order they are listed;
4)

If a rule states that the packet can be transmitted or accepted, it is allowed;

5)

If a rule states that the packet should not be transmitted or accepted, it is dropped;

6)

If no rule can be found to deal with the packet, apply the default-deny rule and drop the

packet.

3.2.1 Advantages
The following are some advantages of packet filtering;
1.

No additional cost since filtering functionality comes with most routers, commercial or non
commercial;

2. Packet filters can be used to control most network traffic effectively.

Especially, traffic

from/to untrusted machines and networks can be effectively restricted or denied;
3.

Effective for eliminating source address forgery— incoming packets that claim to come from a
host in the protected network;

4.

If a well-known service is considered unsafe, packet filters can be used to drop the packets
associated with this service.

The service can be supported using other firewall approaches

such as proxy servers;
5. One screening router can offer a great deal of protection for the entire system;
6. No specialized user procedures are required. In fact, packet filters can be used regardless of
what users do. Thus, they can achieve a high level of transparency;
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7.

Packet filters can be used to log certain types of information, especially when a packet is
dropped because a filtering rule has explicitly denied it. Information that should be logged
about a dropped packet include source/destination addresses, source/destination ports, options
flags, and the filtering rule that had been violated, etc.

As a rule of thumb, the logging

information should be kept in a separate location just in case the filter itself is compromised;
8.

Packet filters are suitable for controlling DNS zone transferring— one DNS server asking
another DNS server to transfer all DNS data to it.

When used together with DNS proxy

servers, an internal DNS can be hidden from the external network(s).

3.2.2 Disadvantages
Disadvantages of packet filtering include:
1. Configuration and maintenance is a major burden for most packet filters.

M ost free and

commercial products lack a good configuration interface, although this is improving in some
leading commercial products. It takes a great deal of knowledge to design, implement, and use
a packer filter safely;
2. Error-prone. Although firewall building generally follows the rule o f default-deny, network
traffic involves volumes of packets and it is always easy to forget to deny some which may be
potentially insecure.

A buggy or incorrectly configured packet filter can be potentially

detrimental. A failed packet filter may still pass packets into the internal system. In another
words, packet filters may not be fail-safe;
3. If a service is needed but the service itself has security holes, packet filtering alone can not
protect a site. Because a filter can be configured to allow or deny a service, but a filter can not
modify a service to eliminate or get around its security deficiencies. Some other approaches
have to be considered in such cases;
4. Some inbound services (such as inbound Telnet) or services that involve multi-channel
connections (such as FTP and X I 1) cannot be easily secured using pure packet filtering
mechanisms.

The client-server relationship in FTP and X I 1 is somewhat obscure when

compared to services that requires only single channel connection. The fundamental difficulty
that is involved in securing these services using packet filtering is that when the inbound
connection(s) needed for these services are allowed, the system can be easily potentially
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attacked, especially data-driven attack. If these kind o f services are needed, we have to ensure
security through means other than firewalls.

For instance, more secure versions of these

services can be used so external hosts are strictly authenticated and data is properly encrypted.
Internal firewalls can also be used so the more sensitive internal network segments are
separated from those less sensitive ones;
5.

The lookup function of DNS is also not a good candidate for packet filtering. As a distributed
database system for mapping host names from/to IP addresses, DNS deals with sensitive
information that can potentially be used by hackers to get a list of targets quickly or to fool a
protected host by using some incomplete DNS records;

6.

Since the filtering rules are static, no context is kept about the network traffic and connection.
Decisions are made only based on the information carried by the packet under examination.
This creates difficulty for monitoring analysis.

3.3 Proxy Servers
Proxy servers are also known as application or application-level gateways. Proxy servers are
used to provide access to external internetwork via a single host or limited number of hosts running
specialized applications or server programs. The host is usually a dual-homed host or a bastion
host that has access to the external internetwork and can be accessed from hosts in the internal
network.
A proxy service consists of two parts: a proxy server and a proxy client. A dual-homed host
or a bastion host running the proxy server is usually transparent to the user. The proxy server
approach implements a firewall by building a physical barrier between a client in the internal
network system and a server in the external network(s). If a particular service provided by a server
in the external internetwork is considered unsafe but is still needed by a site, a proxy server,
usually service specific, can be used to “fix” or get around the security holes of the service. Proxy
servers can make the request and take care of the traffic on behalf of the client. First, the client
connects to the proxy server to make the request, then the proxy server determines whether the
request is legitimate. If the request is legitimate, it then talks to the real server on behalf of the
client, retrieves tire requested information and passes it back to the client. If tire user wants to talk
to tire outside world, the program on his/her machine first talks to the machine running tire proxy
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server. Then the proxy server assesses the request from the user machine and decides whether to
relay the request to the real server on behalf of the user. When replies come back from the real
server, the proxy server passes them back to the user (Figure 3). Normally, the user’s perception
is that s/he is talking to the real server, more or less, “directly” without any intermediate agent, or
in another words, proxy servers are usually transparent to the client.
Some proxy servers are specialized software for particular services, such as the HTTP and
FTP proxy server.

Some standard services can be configured to be self-proxying, such as a

standard SM TP server.
Usually, a proxy client needs to be configured or even modified in order to make proxying
work. This can be done either by obtaining an appropriate version, or by obtaining the source code
and modify it. Many clients, such as W eb browsers, come pre-configured to work with proxy
servers.
A proxy server needs to be configured so it can interact with both the client and the real
server. The TIS Firewall Toolkit includes a set of proxy servers such as ftp-gw, plug-gw (for
socket-to-socket service), and tn-gw (for Telnet service). These proxy servers do not require client
user interface be modified.

ms

Proxy Server

Proxy Client

Real Server

Figure 3. A proxy system consists of a proxy client, a proxy server, and a real server. Proxy
servers are usually run on dual-homed hosts with routing capabilities disabled or on wellfortified bastion hosts.
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3.3.1 Advantages
The following are some advantages of proxy servers:
1. Proxying does not require any special hardware, it only needs a dual-homed or bastion host on
which it can be run;
2.

Although the actual proxying process provides users indirect access to the outside world, die
users’ perception, more or less, is that they have access to the outside world directly;

3. Since proxy servers are mostly service specific, die mechanism can provide very effective
logging.

In most cases, one only need to record the information in order to keep logging

meaningful, such as the commands and options used by the particular service being proxies;
4. Proxy servers can be used to do some content analysis for possible information leakage,
however, for both privacy and performance concerns, this feature should be used with great
caution;
5. The proxy server approach seems to be a more complicated approach, but in many cases it is
also a far more secure and effective approach than other alternatives.

Only those insecure

services need to be proxied, without worrying too much about filtering rules or keeping track
of potentially numerous untrusted hosts;
6. A buggy proxy server is usually fail-safe. A failed proxy server will stop providing the service
for the client;
7. M ost DNS servers have built-in proxy features so that one can serve as a proxy server for
another.

DNS servers always function as proxy servers for regular clients.

As we have

mentioned earlier, packet filters are suitable for controlling DNS zone transferring. If a pair of
DNS servers— one is the internal server, one is the external proxy server— is used together
with a packet filter, the internal DNS can be hidden from incoming DNS lookups;
8. Proxy servers can be used for address translation or remapping;
9. Proxy servers can be easily used for store-and-forward applications which make provisions for
redirection, such as SMTP, because no new or specialized client program needs to be provided.

3.3.2 Disadvantages
Disadvantages of proxy servers include:
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1. Proxy servers require that internal host(s) cannot have direct communication with the external
system(s). They have to be used together with some kind of IP-level restriction between the
client and the real server, using mechanisms such as dual-homed host or packet filtering. If a
dual-homed host is used, the host should be configured so normal packet routing is not
allowed. If no IP-level restriction is applied, then proxy servers can be easily bypassed;
2. Proxy servers are service-specific for many services. A proxy server is usually only targeted
to a single service or a limited set of services, for example, an FTP proxy server is usually
only used to proxy a particular FTP service;
3. To be able to proxy a service, the system administrator usually has to modify the client, and
sometimes the client interfaces. For some services, it is impossible to insert a proxy server
between the client and the real server, especially when the communication of the service is too
“disorganized” for a security administrator to specialize the client or the client interface, such
as talk used in UNIX systems;
4. The implementation of proxy servers usually falls behind the targeted services unless they are
designed to have built-in proxying capabilities— such as a standard HTTP server.

It takes

considerable amount of time to understand a service and then design and implementation a
proxy server;
5. Performance of proxy servers is usually a concern due to the cost of context switching—
packets that go through proxy servers have to be demultiplexed and encapsulated;
6. Proxy servers can not protect the data because a proxy server has to know tire data in order to
judge whether it was dangerous or not— the data will be exposed once the server is
compromised;
7. For applications that do not make provisions for redirection, a specialized client program has
to be provided in order to make proxying feasible.

Often, the client software has to be

modified so it knows how to talk with the proxy server, or the normal procedure of the service
has to be customized so that the client can talk to the proxy server first and request the proxy
server to contact the outside network on behalf o f it;
8. Proxy servers may not be sufficient to ensure security in some situations. One solution for this
is to use an intelligent proxy server that filters out insecure commands of a service, however, it

18

is difficult to design and implement such a server, and some of the important functionality of
die service may have to be compromised;
9.

Some clients and procedures can not be modified for proxying, such as ping and traceroule.
Since most such services are usually small and inherently safe, direct support of tiiese services
on a bastion host is generally not a big security concern as long as some mechanism (a shell,
for instance) are provided to allow users to use only these services but not those that are being
proxied.

3.4 Circuit-Level Gateways
Also known as general-purpose proxy servers.

The circuit-level gateway approach

implements a firewall by relaying TCP connections between the internal and die external
network(s). After the connection is established between certain ports, the circuit-level gateway in
die firewall copies data back and forth and does some checking in the relaying process. In general,
circuit-level gateways don’t check the data, but some kind of logging information is kept on the
number of bytes and the nature of the connection for later use in case a security breach has
occurred. Similar to proxy servers, die relay mechanism used by circuit-level gateways requires
diat die client program be modified or completely rewriden.
In a sense, circuit-level gateways are very similar to proxy servers because they also use the
proxy mechanism to secure a service. In some classifications they are not even distinguished from
die application gateways— the proxy servers (Chapman and Zwicky, 1995).

3.4.1 Advantages
Some advantages of circuit-level gateways include:
1.

Not service-specific.

A circuit-level gateway can handle a collection of services if it is

designed and implemented properly;
2.

Can be used to effectively achieve security for some UDP services, such as printing service;

3.4.2 Disadvantages
Circuit-level gateways have the following disadvantages;
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1.

Only suitable for services that have simple clients and straightforward client interfaces. This
type o f firewall components is not widely used in common firewall architectures;

2.

Requires new or modified client program in order to create a virtual circuit for the proxy
process;

3.

A application that requires a specific local port is hard to be secured using circuit-level
gateways.

3.5 Stateful Multilayer Inspection
Also called dynamic packet filtering, stateful multilayer inspection is not really a new firewall
technology.

However, it is not widely used in traditional firewall products due to some

design/implementation difficulties and performance concerns.

It is known used in a few

commercial products, such as Checkpoint Firewall 1, CYC ON Labyrinth Firewall, and ON Guard
Firewall. It seems the technology is gradually growing in maturity in the last couple of years.
Very limited technical information is available for stateful multilayer inspection. In general,
stateful multilayer inspection works pretty much like packet filtering, but in a more sophisticated
and powerful fashion. Instead of feeding packets to a proxy server, it uses scripting program s and
a set o f dynamic rules, to track and inspect packets up to the application layer and retrieve the data
needed to sufficiently secure a service. Thus, products using stateful multilayer inspection do not
need to design and implement a separate proxy server for each targeted service.

Each inbound

static rule is associated with a outbound dynamic rule. H ie static rales initiate the dynamic rules,
and the dynamic rules are used to track and monitor the expected replies.

3.5.1 Advantages
Some advantages of stateful multilayer inspection include:
1.

Since the filtering rale are dynamic, some kind of context is kept about the network traffic and
connection. This ensures active monitoring and maintenance;

2.

Can support address translation or remapping. Addresses, ports, and identifiers in the packets
can be rewritten on the other side of die connection using the dynamic rales. Thus, internal IP
addresses can be easily hidden from die external world;
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3. Traditional packet filtering leaves large gaps in the TCP/U DP port range since quite a few
services can not be easily filtered. The gaps are narrowed in products using stateful multilayer
inspection;
4. No separate proxy server is needed for each targeted service;
5. Although stateful multilayer inspection needs to keep track and examine packets dynamically
up to the highest level, the performance is usually better than proxy servers since no context
switching is involved for packets.

3.5.2 Disadvantages
It also has some disadvantages:
1. No freeware packages using the technology are available. Thus, it not suitable for a buildyour-own firewall construction approach;
2. The technology is somewhat more sophisticated than traditional packet filtering and proxy
servers. Especially the dynamic rule creation requires a comprehensive understanding of the
service and the security-related details at all levels.

4. FIREWALL ARCHITECTURES
In Chapter 3, we have described commonly used firewall technologies. In practice, when a
firewall needs to be built based on the security needs of a site, they are a number of architectural
models that can be followed to put various needed components together to ensure that their
capacity is maximized.
There are four major firewall architectures: bare-bones screening router architecture, dualhomed host architecture, screened host architecture, and screened subnet architecture. Only the
last three are widely used.

A more detailed description about these architectures is given by

Chapm an and Zwicky (1995). In this chapter, I will briefly review these firewall architectures and
their variations and summarize their pros and cons.
Before we jum p into the discussion, let’s further review three key concepts frequently used to
describe firewall architectures: host, dual-homed host, and bastion host.

A host is a computer

system attached to a network, generally its security mostly relies on whatever is provided by the
operating system vendor. This level of security is referred to as host security.

A dual-homed, or

multi-homed host is a host that has at least two network hardware addresses and belongs to at least
two network systems at the same time, thus the adjective dual-homed, or multi-homed.

Dual

homed hosts can be used to run proxy servers. A bastion host is a single-homed host, usually on
the internal network, used to provide general service(s) to the outside world and/or to run proxy
servers. Thus, a bastion host is highly vulnerable to outside attack and should be well-fortified. A
site can setup more than one bastion host to run various kinds of general servers or proxy servers.

4.1 Bare-bones Screening Router
In this architecture, only a router with packet filtering is used to protect the internal system
(Figure 4).

This architecture offers a straightforward and economic approach for firewall

construction since most sites should already have a router in order to connect to an external system.
In practice, the screening router is rarely used alone in a firewall architecture due to the
weaknesses present in traditional packet filtering technology.
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4.1.1 Advantages
The pros of this architecture is mostly related to the advantages of packet filters, please see
Section 3.2 on page 12 for more detail.

4.1.2 Disadvantages
The cons of this architecture is mostly related to (lie disadvantages of packet filters as well,
please see Section 3.2 on page 13 for more detail. In addition:
1.

The defense is only single-line.

If the screening router is compromised, the whole defense

collapses;
2.

Not fail-safe. A malfunctioning router may still pass packets in and out;

3.

Direct IP traffic between the protected network and the outside world is allowed.

External Network(s)

Screening Router

NetworkqZT)

Figure 4. A packet filtering firewall implemented using just a screening router. Based on the
security policies specified by a site, packets traveling between the internal and external
networks are either routed or dropped by the screening router.
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4.2 Dual-Homed Host
A dual-homed host firewall architecture, by its name, is a firewall architecture constructed
using a dual-homed host placed between the internal network and the external internetwork (Figure
5). A dual-homed host can be configured to have routing capabilities, however, if a dual-homed
host is intended to be used in a dual-homed firewall architecture, the routing capability should be
disabled.

As a result, no direct flow of packets will occur between the internal and external

networks.

Both the internal and the external networks can directly communicate with the dual

homed host, the firewall, and the communication between the internal and the external networks
has to go through the firewall indirectly.

Thus, the dual-homed host can run proxy servers or

firewall products using stateful multilayer inspection.

4.2.1 Advantages
lire advantages of tire dual-homed architecture include:

External Network(s)

Dual-Homed Host

□ □
F igure 5. A dual-homed host firewall architecture in which the firewall consists of only one
component— a dual-homed host with routing capabilities disabled. No direct packet flow
occurs between the internal and external systems and security is mainly achieved by using
proxy servers.
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1. The dual-homed host architecture is simple and straightforward;
2. Direct IP traffic between the protected network and the outside world iscompletely prohibited.
Thus, this architecture can be used to achieve a high level of security;
3. Some types of security breaches can be easily identified in this architecture, such as packets
with external source addresses that appear inside the protected network;
4.

The dual-homed host can be used to make sure that the claimed service m atch the right type of
data, although this will probably reduce the performance of the firewall. If the service and the
data do not match, the communication should be considered potentially detrimental and thus
should be terminated. This is a advantage over packet filters since filters can not be easily
configured to do this type of work.

4.2.2 Disadvantages
The dual-homed architecture has the following disadvantages:
1.

No depth of defense. The defense is only single-line. If the dual-homed host is compromised,
the whole defense collapses. A very high level of host security is demanded for the dual-homed
host. Host level security can be enhanced by running a bare-bones standard or proprietary
operating system;

2.

Requires constant effort to maintain the firewall since the dual-homed host has to be
specifically configured to accommodate the dynamic needs of different services by users;

3.

Security is achieved only by proxying needed services. If a site only needs services which can
be proxied, this architecture is usually recommended;

4.

Not suitable for a site who needs quite a few non-standard services that are hard or even
impossible to be proxied. One can walk around the problem by maintaining user accounts on
the dual-homed host and ask internal users to bear the inconvenience to directly log into the
dual-homed host and then communicate with the outside world. This approach is generally not
a good idea for security management because user accounts have to be maintained outside the
protection zone of the firewall.

User accounts on a dual-homed host may pose potential

security threats because some of these legitimate users may accidentally “activate” unsafe
services within the firewall.
considered.

For better security, other architectural alternatives should be
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4.3 Screened Host
The screened host firewall architecture usually consists of two main firewall components: a
router and a bastion host (Figure 6). The router is used not only to route packets for the external
internetwork and the bastion host, but also to provide a certain degree of protection for the firewall
host through packet filtering. Thus the router is essentially a screening router.
Similar to the dual-homed host architecture, no direct flow of packets occurs between the
outside world and any internal host, except the bastion host.

Instead, packet traffic for needed

services has to go through the bastion host indirectly. Unlike a dual-homed host, a bastion host is
not dual-homed. Instead, it is simply a host of the internal network with some higher level of host
security. Insecure outbound traffic is directed to the bastion host first and then to the outsider
world through the screening router.

Insecure inbound traffic is directed through the screening

router solely to the bastion host and then to various hosts in the internal network. In another word,
the screening router and the bastion host are configured so that only the bastion host can have
direct communication for those insecure communications, inbound or outbound, with the external

External Network(s)

Screening Router

Bastion Host

□ Q □
Figure 6. Screened host firewall architecture in which the firewall consists of at least two
components— a bastion host and a screening router. Direct flow of packets is essential in this
architecture.
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network.
It should be noted that in this architecture, there is only one line of defense for the protected
network, although two firewall components are used. The screening router protects the bastion
host from outsider threats. It can be configured so that the bastion host can only have connections
with the outside world that are permitted by the security policies of a site. The filter can provides
security to other internal hosts either by not allowing any direct communication with the outside
world or the filtering rules can be configured to allow only those secure services.

However,

whether or not direct connection are allowed between other hosts and the external world, the
protected network may be comprised if there is a break-in in either of the screening router or the
bastion host.

4.3.1 Advantages
The advantages o f the screened host architecture include:
1. Since the firewall has at least two kinds of firewall components, the architecture is more
flexible than the dual-homed host architecture. Various kinds of services can be secured either
through packet filtering or through proxying. For many services, this architecture provides a
stronger and more flexible security for a network if configured properly;
2. Packet filtering is used to prevent hackers from bypassing the bastion host to directly attack a
host in the protected network.

The screening router also provide some protection for the

bastion host.

4.3.2 Disadvantages
The screened host architecture has the following disadvantages:
1. Unlike the dual-homed host architecture, in which packets with external sources are not
allowed in the internal network, packets with external sources in this architecture are permitted
to flow into the internal netw ork This put the protected network at potential risk;
2. There is no depth of defense. Although the firewall consists of two firewall components, the
defense of this architecture is actually single-line. Both the router and the bastion host are the
single-point-of-failure places. A break-in into either one means the whole internal system is
wide open for attack.
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4.4 Screened Subnet
As we can see in the previous two sections, both the dual-homed host and the screened host
architectures are single-lined firewall defenses. In order to construct a better firewall, some depth
in the defense is needed.
The screened subnet firewall architecture enhances the screened host architecture by using
another router to keep the screening router and the bastion host some distance away from the rest
of the internal system in case either one or both are compromised. The second router is placed
between the bastion host and the rest of the hosts in the internal system and is referred to as the
interior router or the choke router. The screening router in the screened host architecture is placed
between the external internetwork and the bastion host. It does not handle communication for other
hosts in the internal network in any direct form and is called the exterior router or the access
router.

The bastion host, together with the choke and the access routers, forms a perimeter

network or subnetwork which is the actual firewall (Figure 7). This perimeter network or
subnetwork is often nicknamed as the DMZ (the demilitarized zone).
Thus, a screened subnet firewall architecture consists at least three components: an access
router, a bastion host, and a choke router. Some variations of this architecture exist and will be
discussed later in the chapter.
The choke router does most the packet filtering for outbound services that can be safely
supported by a site using packet filtering, these services may include outbound service requests
such as Telnet, FTP, and other general intranetwork or internetwork browsing requests.
The bastion host is responsible for handling incoming connections such as SM TP, FTP, or
DNS queries about the site. It is also responsible for running proxy servers for outbound services
that can not be safely supported using packet filtering by the choke router, of course, assuming
proxying is feasible for these services.
As a general rule of thumb, the number of services supported between the bastion host and
internal network should be minimized, simply to reduce the chance of a security breach into the
internal network. Only those services are absolutely needed by the bastion host should be allowed
between the bastion host and the protected network, such as SM TP for the bastion host to forward
e-mail and DNS to communicate with each individual internal host.

28

External
Network(s)

Access Router

Bastion Host

Choke Router

F igure 7. Screened subnet firewall architecture in which the firewall consists of at least three
components— an access router, a bastion host, and a choke router. This is the only basic firewall
architecture that has some depth of defense and compromise of the access router or a break-in into
the bastion host does not threat the internal system immediately.

The main responsibility of the access router is to protect the DM Z and the internal system by
screening incoming traffic using packet filtering. In general, it does not check outbound traffic for
security purposes, which is usually handled by the bastion host or the choke router, depending on
the types o f services in concern. In practice, the security significance of the access network is
limited to only blocking incoming packet with forged source address— packets that claim to come
from a host in the protected network.

4.4.1 Advantages
The advantages of the screened subnet architecture include:
1.

This architecture has some true depth of defense. Three lines of defense have to be overcome
before an attacker can reach any internal host. It provides the internal network some further
protection than the screened host architecture, although no extra protection is given to die
bastion host itself. If tiiere is a break-in into the bastion host or the exterior router, the internal
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network is not immediately open for attack thus buying some extra time for the defense
because of the existence of the access router;
2.

Strict internal network traffic does not go beyond the choke router;

3.

Better flexibility to support various services than the screened host architecture since the
firewall consists of three components.

4.4.2 Disadvantages
This architecture is the standard form of a “complete” firewall architecture. Some minor cons
exist:
1.

M uch more sophisticated than the other two architectures and requires a comprehensive
understanding about the various aspects of the firewall;

2.

Traffic in the DM Z should not contain any critical information about the protected network
that can be potentially used by attackers. Thus, firewall software configuration m ust be done
with great caution.

4.5 Architectural Variations
In practice, the four standard firewall architectures described can be followed more or less
flexibly.

Depending on the hardware capacity, budget and personnel constraints, and security

needs of a site, firewall components used in a architecture may be omitted or merged.

In this

section, I will briefly introduce some of the architectural variations.

4.5.1 Combined Dual-Homed Host and Screened Subnet
This architectural hybrid combines a dual-homed host and a screened subnet for the firewall
construction. The dual-homed host is placed inside the DMZ. Thus, the whole configuration adds
one more defense line to tire screened subnet architecture. The packet filtering responsibilities of
the access and choke routers can be significantly reduced and the dual-homed host will take over
for this part of the work. It provides more fine-tuned control over connections, however, great
caution needs to be asserted during software configuration since the dual-homed host configuration
tends to be error-prone.

The routers in this variation are mostly used to fight against source

address forgery. If configured properly, the reliability of the firewall can be greatly enhanced.
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4.5.2 Layered DMZs
This variation uses interleaved bastion hosts and routers to provide different levels of security
for supported services3, although performance of the firewall is compromised in many cases. The
least reliable services are provided in the outermost screened subnet and the most reliable ones
placed in the innermost subnet. It should be noted that for services that are secured using packet
filtering, the multilayer security is only guaranteed when the layered choke routers are using
diversified filtering rules, which can hardly be realized in practice.

4.5.3 Multiple DMZs
Similar to the layered DMZ variation, tire multiple DMZs use multiple perimeter networks.
The major difference is that the perimeter networks in this variation are not layered, instead, they
are scattered around the system being protected. Multiple DMZs are needed when a system need
to link to multiple external internetworks and security policies for the communication with external
systems are not the same. For example, one firewall may be configured to handle communication
with the Internet, the other may be configured to handle communication with a peer external system
located in a remote place. The advantage of using this architectural variation is that the DM Zs are
independent of each other, break-in into one will not immediately compromise the other.

4.5.4 Multiple Bastion Hosts
Multiple bastion hosts can be used inside the perimeter network in order to provide certain
level of redundancy or to increase the overall performance o f a DM Z firewall. The multiple bastion
hosts can be configured to run dedicated special-purpose servers (such as a W eb server) or proxy
servers (such as a file transferring proxy server).

Multiple bastion hosts in a screened subnet

architecture ensure that if one bastion host is compromised, others are not immediately at risk.
They also allow us to be able to separate pure firewall functions from other services.

3 Usually, this variation has two (at most three) layers of DMZs, which consists of one access router, one bastion
host in the outer perimeter network, one middle choke router, one bastion host in the inner perimeter network, and
one inner choke router with direct connection with the internal system.
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4.5.5 Multiple Access Routers
If a site has connections with more than one external systems, multiple access routers can be
used in a screened subnet firewall architecture. Each access router connects the bastion host with
an external system and unique filtering rule sets can be specified for each access router.

A

potential problem with this firewall variation is that once the bastion host is compromised, all
network traffic in the DM Z is exposed.

4.5.6 Single Router or Merged Routers
A powerful and reliable router with multiple network interfaces can be used to handle die
responsibilities of both the access and choke routers. However, this variation should be used with
great caution because it possesses the flaws present in the screened host architecture,.

For

instance, if the router is compromised, the whole defense collapses. A break-in into the bastion
host, tiiough, does not immediately threat the internal system.

4.5.7 Merged Access Router and Bastion Host
This variation uses a dual-homed host to perform the functionality of both the access router
and the bastion host. It is essentially the same as the standard screened subnet architecture, except
that the performance and flexibility may be reduced to some extent because of the lack of a
dedicated access router. If the performance of the firewall is not a big concern for a site, this
variation is a more economic alternative than a standard screened subnet architecture.

4.6 Architectural Violations
Although the standard firewall architectures can be used more or less flexibly depending on
the hardware capacity, budget constraints, and security needs of a site, there are certain unsafe
architectural variations that should be avoided.

4.6.1 Merged Choke Router and Bastion Host
In a screened subnet architecture, the fundamental protection for the internal system is
provided by the bastion host and die choke router. The access router provides only a limited level
of protection for the perimeter network.

The perimeter network is relatively easy to be

compromised since most sites only use the access router to filter packets with forged source
addresses. If the choke router and the bastion host are merged using a dual-homed host or some
other means, all internal network activities will be exposed when there is a break-in into the dual
homed host— the merged choke router and bastion host. Thus, merging the choke router and the
bastion host should be avoided in firewall construction.

4.6.2 Multiple Choke Routers
Using multiple choke routers in a screened subnet architecture is also not recommended. In
fact, any attempts of this sort should be strictly prohibited in firewall construction. M ultiple choke
routers in a firewall may lead to undesirable routing decisions by these routers and may potentially
leak sensitive internal network information into the perimeter network. Thus, using multiple choke
routers nullifies the security significance of a choke router in a screened subnet architecture.

5. FIREWALL BUILDING
Having reviewed commonly used firewall technologies and architectures, now let’s turn our
attention to firewall construction in practice.

As a matter of fact, the flexibility in firewall

construction is sometimes so great that the decisions for a specific network environment may not
always be so clear to security administrators (Knowles, 1997).
In general, security management follows four major steps (Leinwand and Fang, 1993; Cooper
et al, 1995):
1) Identify what is needed and what needs to be protected;
2) Find the access points;
3)

Secure these access points;

4)

Maintain the security mechanisms .

The first step implies that the security management personnel should know or should be
informed how much network connection, internal and external, is needed and what are the
resources and devices under their control that must be protected. Then, based on these needs, the
risk zone should be identified in the context of the internetwork (including the internal system) and
the potential dangerous access points to the resources and devices should be identified.

Next,

based on the previous analysis, security management personnel should clearly define a set of
security rules that can be used to isolate the resources and devices needed to be protected from the
risk zone, by designing security mechanisms to secure these access points. The security policies
should be defined in terms of what will be allowed and what will not be allowed. The last step
refers to the ongoing process of maintaining, enhancing, and updating the implemented security
mechanisms.
The zone of risk consists of areas in an internetwork where hackers can mount malicious
attacks, areas other forms of danger can originate, and areas where hosts are vulnerable to attacks.
It includes the Internet at large and any other external network system a site has connection with,
and the part of the internal network consisting of unprotected TCP/IP-capable and non-capable
hosts which have some form of unsecured connection with other unprotected TCP/IP-capable hosts
(Cooper et al, 1995).

Non-TCP/IP-capable hosts which are connected to other TCP/IP-capable

hosts can be compromised through the common protocol(s) used between them.
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When firewalls are considered to be part of the security infrastructure to enhance die overall
security of a site, the same four steps of security management apply. In this chapter, we will apply
die materials that have been reviewed in previous chapters to present firewall alternatives for a
hypothetical example. More specifically, we will apply the information that have been reviewed
and present alternatives for implementing feasible firewall mechanisms in a hypothetical small
software development company—identify its security needs, define security policies that will be
targeted to address these needs, and determine what firewall architecture should be used to enforce
these policies— as one of the many security aspects.

In order to make firewall construction

possible for this hypothetical example, we have to make a few assumptions. W hen identifying the
security needs, only those that can be more or less effectively addressed by using firewall
techniques are focused on.

5.1 A Hypothetical Example
The hypothetical example is a small software development company, which we will denote as
HSSDCorp in later discussions.

We assume that HSSDCorp consists of a set of institutional

branches, including Support, Training, Programming, Testing, Sales, Advertising, Accounting,
top-level Administration, and so on.
First, it is reasonable for us to assume electronic mail is an essential needed service for the
company as a whole in order to communicate with people inside and outside the company quickly.
We further assume that the company uses SM TP-based electronic mail rather than a proprietary
system.
L et’s further assume HSSDCorp produces a series of software products which are more or
less extensively used across the country and the situation requires the com pany’s support and
training personnel to not only keep close contact with its customers from their home base but also
requires them to periodically travel around to provide on-site training and assistance for the clients.
While they are traveling and out in the field they also need to keep close contact with the company
for instant advise and recommendation from the company’s top-level management or experts in a
particular field. The customers and the support personnel may also need to remotely fetch updated
product components and patches. In addition, to reduce the work load of field support and training
personnel, providing on-line customer support is also desirable.

For employees working in
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Programming and Testing, the nature of their work does not really require extensive traveling,
however, let’s assume they are allowed to work at home in order to improve their work
productivity. Occasionally, when an employee is traveling around the country, s/he may also need
to access the site remotely. Also, for programmers, being able to surf the Internet and participate
in the Internet newsgroup discussions are considered essential for their work in order to get tree on
line expert help for some of their work related problems. For people working in Advertising, Sales,
and Accounting, their work may require the company to maintain an Internet W W W home page to
promote the company’s products and to push for on-line sale and billing.

For top-level

Administration, besides basic electronic mail service, on-line job recruiting capability should also
be provided in order to reduce the cost.
Although in any real-life example the service requirements could be more or less sophisticated
than what we have assumed, we believe tine assumptions made above are very representative of
many small-to-medium-sized software development companies with respects to the kind of network
services needed. Moreover, since our purpose is to provide enough assumptions so we can apply
the materials that have been reviewed in previous chapters, making our hypothetical example
typical is not our goal here.
Based on the assumptions given above, we conclude that, collectively, HSSDCorp needs the
following network services: inbound and outbound electronic mail, inbound and outbound tile
transfer, inbound remote network access, Internet browsing, and newsgroup service. In addition, it
also needs to maintain a W W W home page for on-line marketing, customer feedback, bug report,
customer support, job recruiting, and so on.

Anonymous file transfer service should also be

provided to post software updates or patches, demo versions, and so forth.
Based on the above assumptions, let’s start our firewall building process. Before we begin,
let’s state that since our example is a small software development company, we will ignore any
internal network diversification and will not discuss any potential internal firewall alternatives.
We further assume that these needs justify an Internet connection, and that the presence of the
company on the Internet will be permanent.
connection with the Internet.

We assume the company will use a leased-line
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5.2 Security Analysis
For the network services either needed by the company or that need to be provided to lire
outside world, we will first analyze the security concerns associated with each of these services.
After the needs have been decided, our next step is to define a set of security polices that can be
used to fulfill the needs in terms of what should be allowed or denied. As far as the firewall is
concerned, only those policies that are targeted to keep outsiders out from a site will be focused on
since firewalls are not intended to fight against threats that originate from the internal system.

5.2.1 General
There are a few general security policies that apply to any network systems. First, we should
eliminate address spoofing attacks in which incoming packets claim to be from the internal system
or from the bastion host in the DMZ.

These type of attack can be screened out using packet

filtering rules. There maybe some external hosts or networks that cause security concerns, and
thus are considered unsafe. Any kind of connection with these hosts should be denied until their
reputation is restored. If we are to use a screened subnet architecture, we should also block any
TC P connection requests initiated by external hosts.

In general, we should allow reply TCP

packets since these type of packets generally do not pose any security concerns.
For specific protocols, we should specify our packet filtering rules to control the flow of
packets or we can use proxy services to secure the protocol if packet filtering is not safe enough or
not feasible. All other kind of packets that are not specifically allowed should be denied based on
the firewall default-deny principle, such as external requests for X I 1, RPC, or “r ” services (rlogin,
rsh, rep, and etc.).
Table 1 and Table 2 summaries some filtering rules used to enforce these general security
policies, assuming we are to use a screened subnet architecture in our firewall design (see Section
5.3).
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T able 1. Packet filtering rules in the access router for general security policies. The general rules are similar to that
used in the choke router, except that incoming packet claim to be from the DMZ will be dropped.
Direction

Action

Incoming
Incoming
Incoming
Incoming

Deny
Deny
Allow
Deny

Incoming
Outgoing

Deny
Deny

Source
Address
Internal
DMZ
*
Ext. hosts on
the black list

*
*

Source
Port
*
*
*
*

Destination
Address
*
*
*
*

*
*

*
*

Destination
Port
*
*
*
*

Protocol
Flags Option
*
*

Description

ACK = 1
*

Prevent address spoofing
Prevent address spoofing
Allow reply from ext. servers
Deny connection with ext. hosts
that are on the black list
Rules for .specific protocols

*
*

Default deny for incoming packet
Default deny for outgoing packet

T able 2. Packet filtering rules in the choke router for general security policies.
Direction

Action

Incoming
Incoming
Incoming

Deny
Allow
Deny

Incoming
Outgoing

Deny
Deny

Source
Address
Internal
*
Ext. hosts on
the black list

Source
Port
*
*
*

Destination
Address
*
*
*

*
*

*
*

*
*

Destination
Port
*
*
*

Protocol
Flags Option
*
ACK = 1
*

*
*

Description
Prevent address spoofing
Allow reply from ext. servers
Deny connection with ext. hosts
that are on the black list
Rules for specific protocols

Default deny for incoming packet
Default deny for outgoing packet

5.2.2 Electronic Mail
E-mail, inbound and outbound, is an essential service for almost any site. Since e-mail is used
with very high frequency and it allows almost all kinds of data to be sent and received across
networks, this service poses great challenges to system administrators on how to secure mail
transport agents, delivery and user agents (Schneier, 1995).
In a mail system, the mail transport agent receives messages directly from external hosts; the
delivery agent distributes messages to different users; the user agent runs various kinds of
program s in response to the message it received.

Thus, the transport agent is vulnerable to

command channel attacks. The delivery and user agents are at risk under data-driven attacks.
The basic open protocol used for electronic mail exchange is SM TP, which is a store-andforward system. On most UNIX machines, Sendmail is the widely used mail transport agent for
SM TP.

Sendmail uses a privileged port (port 25) for incoming SM TP connection.

The main

security problem associated with Sendmail is that, due to some design and implementation bugs,
many versions have security holes that allow hackers to steal the superuser privileges and mount
command channel attacks.
To avoid command channel and data-driven attacks associated with a mail system, incoming
mail messages should never flow directly to any internal mail server. This essentially leaves us
only one firewall alternative—the screened subnet architecture running a secured proxy SM TP
server4 on a bastion host in the DMZ.

To avoid incoming mail messages to directly go to an

internal mail server, we can use packet filtering to direct all inbound SM TP connections to the
SM TP proxy server running on a bastion host. Then the proxy server in the DM Z will direct the
messages to a secured internal mail server. The bastion host needs to forward e-mail to the internal
network, thus SM TP has to be supported between the bastion host and the internal network (Table
3).
T able 3. Packet filtering rules used in the choke router for SMTP.
Direction

Action

Source

Outgoing

Allow

Internal

Incoming

Allow

Incoming

Allow

Outgoing

Allow

Bastion
SMTP server
Bastion
SMTP seiver
Internal
SMTP seiver

Source
Port
> 1023
25
> 1023
25

Destination
Bastion
SMTP server
Internal
Internal
SMTP server
Bastion
SMTP seiver

Destination
Port
25

Protocol
Flags Option
*

> 1023

ACK = 1

25

*

> 1023

ACK = 1

Description
Allow outbound mail between
the bastion host and int. hosts

Allow inbound mail between the
bastion host and int. SMTP
server

Table 4. Packet filtering rules used in the access router for SMTP.
Direction

Action

Source

Outgoing

Allow

Incoming

Allow

Incoming

Allow

Outgoing

Allow

Bastion
SMTP server
External
SMTP server
External
SMTP server
Bastion
SMTP server

Source
Port
>1023
25
> 1023
25

Destination
External
SMTP server
Bastion
SMTP seiver
Bastion
SMTP server
External
SMTP seiver

Destination
Port
25

Protocol
Flags Option
ACK = 0, 1

>1023

ACK = 1

25

ACK = 0, 1

>1023

ACK = 1

Description
Allow outbound mail between
the bastion host and ext. hosts

Allow inbound mail between
the bastion host and ext. hosts

4 Electronic mail is often passed through a proxy server, no matter what other components are used in a firewall
design.
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Most store-and-forward systems are easy to be secured by using proxy services. TIS FW TK
provides a mail proxy service, smap and smapd for UNIX systems. The proxy service can prevent
hackers to connect directly to Sendmail, instead, outside SM TP servers have to speak to smapd in
order to delivery any mail messages.
SM TP is a TCP-based protocol, which implies that packet filters can be configured so that
inbound and outbound electronic mail exchange only occur between external hosts and a firewall
SM TP server, and between a firewall SM TP server and the internal SM TP server (Table 3 and
Table 4).

5.2.3 File Transfer
The generic version FTP is widely used in the Internet community to transfer files across
networks. FTP is a TCP-based protocol and is easy to setup. To be able to provide the service,
FTP needs to establish two TCP connections.

One connection is used by the client to send

commands to the server and to receive reply from the server. The other is used to transfer files to
tine client once permission is granted by the server.
Further, an FTP session can be run in two modes: normal mode and passive mode. In the
normal mode, the client uses two random ports above 1023 for the two connections respectively,
and the server uses port 21 for the command connection and port 20 for the data connection. The
client first uses one of the random ports and opens the command connection with the server’s port
21. Immediately after receiving the server’s acknowledgment, the client uses the PO R T command
and tells the server the second port it has allocated for the channel. The data connection is initiated
by the server using port 20 in response to the client’s PO RT command. In the passive mode, the
client first opens the command connection and immediately after receiving the server’s
acknowledgment it uses the PASV command and tell the server to allocate a random port for the
data channel. After receiving the server’s acknowledgment, the client initiates the data channel
connection.

5.2.3.1 Client
Since a normal mode outbound FTP session involves an inbound data channel connection,
securing it using packet filtering is not feasible if we are not allowing any inbound TCP
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connections.

To run FTP clients using normal mode, we need to use a proxy server so the

connection can be relayed.
In the passive mode, packet filtering is feasible for the client since both connections are
initiated by the client.

Most W eb browsers has built-in FTP clients that support passive mode

FTP. If we are allowing internal users to surf the Internet using certain types of W eb browsers, it
will be more cost-effective to simply use these built-in FTP clients to reduce the work load for
system administrators.
W e can configure the firewall to secure internal FTP clients that support passive mode FTP
using packet filtering, Table 5 shows how.
T able 5. Packet filtering rules used in both the choke and the access routers for FTP clients that support passive
mode.
Direction

Action

Source

Outgoing
Incoming
Outgoing
Incoming

Allow
Allow
Allow
Allow

Internal
*
Internal
*

Source
Port
> 1023
21
> 1023
> 1023

Destination
*
Internal
*
Internal

Destination
Port
21
> 1023
> 1023
> 1023

Protocol
Flags Option
ACK = 0
ACK = 1
ACK = 0
ACK = 1

Description
Allow outgoing passive mode
FTP connections

There are times when packet filtering on FTP clients that support passive mode is not feasible,
and we have to consider using proxy mechanisms to secure FTP clients. In this case, we still need
to specify the filtering rules to support this kind of connection (Table 6 and Table 7).

Normal

mode FTP sessions are easy to secure using proxy servers in which requests initiated by the real
server to establish the data channel do not go directly to the client. The trouble associated with
using freeware FTP proxy servers such as SOCKS and TIS FW TK is that they require modified
clients or client procedures, and these are somewhat time consuming to setup. However, m ost Web
browsers such as Netscape Navigator support proxy features for their built-in FTP client. Thus,
W eb browsers offer feasible alternatives for outbound FTP.
T able 6. Packet filtering rules used in the choke router to enable normal mode FTP proxy connections.
Direction

Action

Source

(Outgoing

Allow

Internal

Incoming

Allow

Incoming

Allow

Outgoing

Allow

Bastion
FTP Server
Bastion
FTP Server
Internal

Source
Port
> 1023

Destination

Destination
Port
21

Protocol
Flags Option
ACK = 0

> 1023

ACK = 1

21

Bastion
FTP Server
Internal

> 1023

Internal

> 1023

ACK = 0

> 1023

Bastion
FTP Server

> 1023

ACK = 1

Description
Allow outgoing FTP command
connections to bastion host

Allow incoming FTP data
connections from bastion host
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Tab le 7. Packet filtering rules used in the access router to enable normal mode FTP proxy connections.

Direction

Action

Source

Outgoing

Allow

Incoming

Allow

Incoming

Allow

Outgoing

Allow

Bastion
FTP Server
External
FTP Server
External
FTP Server
Bastion
FTP Server

Source
Port
>1023
21
20
> 1023

Destination
External
FTP Server
Bastion
FTP Server
Bastion
FTP Server
External
FTP Server

Destination
Port
21

Protocol
Flags Option
ACK = 0

> 1023

ACK = 1

> 1023

ACK = 0

20

ACK = 1

Description
Allow outgoing FTP command
connections to ext. hosts

Allow incoming FTP data
connections from ext. hosts

5.2.3.2 Server
There are two types of FTP services that can be offered: anonymous FTP and user-oriented
FTP. The first kind is intended for the Internet community while the later is usually intended for
company employees that are traveling on the road or working at home.
Anonym ous FTP Service
For information that are intended to be publicly accessible, anonymous FTP can be offered.
Anonymous FTP prevents real login and password information from passing over the network. It
is easy to setup and with anonymous FTP one can restrict user actions by defining the permissions
of the “guest” account. Anonymous FTP can also restrict users’ access to the file system. As a
rule of thumb, anonymous FTP server should not be run internally, instead it should be run in the
perimeter network if we are to choose the screened subnet architecture (see Section 5.3). Table 8
shows the filtering rules used in the access router for inbound anonymous FTP request. Packets
associated with inbound anonymous FTP request will be denied by default in the choke router.

Packet filtering rules used in the access router to enable normal mode and passive mode FTP service
provided in the perimeter zone.
Tab le 8.

Direction

Action

Source

Incoming
Outgoing
Outgoing
Incoming
Incoming
Outgoing

Allow
Allow
Allow
Allow
Allow
Allow

External
Bastion
Bastion
External
External
Bastion

Source
Port
> 1023
21
20
> 1023
> 1023
> 1023

Destination
Bastion
External
External
Bastion
Bastion
External

Destination
Port
21
> 1023
> 1023
20
> 1023
> 1023

Protocol
Flags Option
ACK = 0
ACK = 1
ACK = 0
ACK = 1
ACK = 0
ACK = 1

Description
Allow guest FTP command
connections
Allow guest FTP data
connections, normal mode
Allow guest FTP data
connections, passive mode
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User-Oriented FTP Service
To the Internet community, we should not consider offering user-oriented FTP services
because of high possibility of potential security breaches.

However, there are times we need to

offer user-oriented FTP services to company employees who are traveling on the road or working
at home, when the information we want to provide is privileged and access to data needs to be
controlled.
As a commonly used network protocol, FTP itself is not particularly insecure, but the basic
operation of the protocol is. W hen we allow a user to use FTP to download tiles from your site,
the user is entering his/her login and password over a non-encrypted path. Thus, we run potential
risks by allowing user-oriented FTP in the internal system because hackers may sniff a legitimate
user’s login information and then get access to the protected network. In general, users should not
be allowed to use FTP to directly connect to an internal host.
Since we have assumed that user-oriented FTP service is needed by the company, we can
provide the service by trying to setup a more secure version of user-oriented FTP service or by
using secured remote dial-up access.
A widely used secure version of FTP is the Washington University (WU) FTP. The protocol
provides a few security features, including secure authentication— control user access based on
group ID, sophisticated logging functions, and automatic service shutdown. W U FTP is also very
suitable for handling large archives. The question is where we should run a W U FTP server in
order to provide the user-oriented file transferring service.

Since we have been trying to avoid

inbound TCP connection to the internal system, running it internally will mean that we have to
open a hole in our defense. A better solution is to run a W U FTP server on a dedicated bastion
host in the perimeter network of a screened subnet architecture and provide user-oriented file
transferring service using that server. O f course, configuration of the server needs great caution.
Besides password-protected user access, sensitive data have to be further protected using other
mechanisms such as encryption. File maintenance on the server should not be a big burden since
authorized internal users can freely access tins server.
We can choose to maintain an internal FTP server and allow secured remote dial-up access
for user-oriented FTP service. Since the security of remote dial-up access is a topic of its own and
is not firewall related, we will not discuss it further.
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Another alternative is to use commercial file transferring services with encryption and secure
authentication, however, this requires us to purchase and use both the servers and tire clients.

5.2.4 Remote Network Access
W e have also assumed that internal users may need access to the internal system remotely,
especially those who are working at home may frequently need to access sensitive files and need
remote login capabilities.
General firewall techniques can offer little help to secure inbound remote access requests.
Mainly, we have to resort to other security measures such as call-back dial-up or other strong
authentication mechanisms in order to achieve security. For instance, the remote access server in
M icrosoft Windows N T (RAS) enables an external host to dial in and see the entire network if it
has permissions, which maintains security with the dial-in clients, and security can be further
enforced using callback connections. Since remote access servers are to be used to access internal
network resources and information, they should be placed on the internal network. Modem pools
used for this purpose should also be placed on the internal network.
Some firewall vendors may provide products which allow high encryption and secure
authentication using mechanism such as one-time password schemes.
Since this topic is beyond the scope of this paper, we will not discuss it further. However, it
is important to note that although the alternatives are not firewall-related, their security should not
be viewed as less significant than that of a firewall.

5.2.5 Network News
To participate in the Internet news activities, a site needs to maintain a news server in order to
receive and post Usenet news. Maintaining news service is resource intensive, it requires a lot of
space to store the news and a lot of CPU time to process the news. Because our example is a
small- to medium- sized company, it really does not need to function as a news feeder and there is
no need to maintain a news server for internal discussions either. In this case, it will be more costeffective not to maintain a news server. Instead, it may be much easier to rely on an ISP to provide
such a service for the internal users. In fact, most ISPs provide such services for their clients. We
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can allow internal users to use their W eb browsers to participate in the Usenet news discussion
since most browsers have built-in Usenet clients.

T able 9. Packet filtering rules used in both the choke and the access routers for outbound NNTP connections.
Direction

Action

Source

Outgoing
Incoming

Allow
Allow

Internal
*

Source
Port
> 1023
119

Destination
*
Internal

Destination
Port
119
> 1023

Protocol
Flags Option
ACK = 0
ACK = 1

Description
Allow outgoing NNTP traffic

The most commonly used protocol for network news transferring is NNTP. NNTP runs over
TCP. The server uses port 119 and the NNTP client can use any port greater than 1023. Similar
to SM TP, NN TP is also a store-and-forward system, which means that a proxy is also feasible.
Since NN TP news feeders can be trusted more than random mail senders, direct flow of network
news can be allowed between the news feeders and the internal news clients with the assistance of
some packet filtering rules (Table 9). NNTP related command channel attacks are very difficult for
attackers, although NNTP related data-driven attacks have occurred before.

5.2.6 WWW Service
Not only we would like to allow our employees to use their W eb browsers, such as Netscape
Navigator or M icrosoft Internet Explorer, to access the Internet, we also want to publish our own
W eb pages in order to post or offer on-line marketing, product or service announcements, custom
support, product reviews or demos, price guides, product updates or patches, and corporate
information, etc.
The standard W W W protocol is the Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP). HTTP is also a
protocol that runs over TCP. HTTP clients can use any port over 1023. The vast majority of
HTTP servers on the Internet use port 80 but some don’t.

5.2.6.1 Client
Besides HTTP, most W eb clients (NCSA Mosaic, Netscape Navigator, or M icrosoft Internet
Explorer) also allow users to navigate efficiently with links to other services such as FTP, Gopher,
and W AIS, etc. These browsers are not only GUI capable, they are also designed to be highly
extensible, which means that they are designed to be able to handle many data formats. The built-in
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functionality of these clients only support a few basic data types such as HTML, GIF, and plain
text. Other types of data lbrmat, present and future, are intended to be supported by using add-ins
or applications that are linked to the browsers5. For instance, if someone needs to view an object
of a graphic format not directly supported by Netscape Navigator in M icrosoft Windows, s/he can
install an add-in viewing application which supports that particular graphical data format so the
object can be viewed. In X Windows, Netscape Navigator can be configured to call ghostview to
process data in postscript format.
On the positive side, the high extensibility of these W eb clients is the driving force behind the
rapid growth of the Internet. On the negative side, the high extensibility opens many opportunities
for malicious hackers to attack sites using these clients. The external applications that can be
launched by W eb browsers can possibly be used by hackers to attack machines running these
clients. For example, in the case of launching ghostview to view postscript data, hackers can insert
file I/O commands in the postscript data to modify or destroy the files on the client machine. CGI
programs embedded in Internet Web pages can potentially do a lot damages to a client.

Java

programs can be used for service-denial attacks.
T ab le 10. Packet filtering rules for HTTP used in the access router of a screened subnet architecture.

Direction

Action

Source

(Xitgoing

Allow

Incoming

Allow

Bastion
HTTP Server
*

Incoming

Allow

*

> 1023

Outgoing

Allow

Bastion
HTTP Server

SO

Source
Port
> 1023

Destination

*

Bastion
HTTP Server
Bastion
HTTP Server
*

*

Destination
Port
*

Protocol
Flags Option
ACK = 0

Description

> 1023

ACK = 1

80

ACK = 0

Allow request from bastion
HTTP server to ext. server
Allow reply from ext. servers to
bastion HTTP server
Allow request from ext. client

>1023

ACK = 1

Allow reply from bastion servers

T ab le 11. Packet filtering rules for HTTP used in the choke router of a screened subnet architecture.

Direction

Action

Source

Outgoing

Allow

Internal

Incoming

Allow

Incoming
Outgoing

Deny
Deny

Bastion
HTTP Server
*
Internal

Source
Port
> 1023

Destination

80

Bastion
HTTP Server
Internal

*
80

Internal
*

Destination
Port
80

Protocol
Flags Option
ACK = 0

> 1023

ACK = 1

80
*

ACK = 0
ACK = 1

Description
Allow request from int. client
to bastion HTTP server
Allow reply from to bastion
HTTP server
Deny request from ext. client
Deny reply from int. servers

5 These applications are local and even remote programs that are used by Web browsers to display, play, preview, or
print data of non-basic data format which are usually not supported by the browsers’ built-in features.
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Hence, to secure a W eb client, we propose the following policies:
1) If internal users are allowed to use W eb browsers to access information on the Internet, they
should be urged not to modify their browsing related configuration files or this must be done in
accordance to specific company security policies;
2) M achines that have sensitive information stored on them should not be allowed to run Web
browsers;
3)

Allow internal users to surf Internet W eb pages from servers running on both port 80 and non
standard ports above 1023.

To enforce the above policies, we propose the following solutions:
1) W rite shell scripts to frequently check that browser configuration files are not modified by
users or they are modified in accordance to company policies. Especially, do not allow users
to run certain privileged shells, spreadsheet, or word-processing applications to automatically
view downloaded data;
2) Disable Web browsing applications on those machines storing sensitive data (users with
sensitive data on their workstations may be able to run a browser on a remote machine using X
Windows);
3)

Use packet filtering to allow internal users to surf the Internet W eb pages running on standard
port 80, see Table 10 and Table 11. W e can use proxy servers, such as the Cern HTTP proxy
server or TIS FW TK proxy server, http-gw, to allow internal users to surf the Internet Web
pages running on non-standard ports.

52.6.2 Server
To publish W eb pages on the Internet, the company needs to maintain a W eb server6.
HTTP-based servers are simple and the security concerns associated with them are limited.
But similar to HTTP-based clients, HTTP-based HTTP servers frequently rely on external
applications.

For instance, customized W eb pages can be generated by most servers running

external CGI or Java scripts. If hackers can find a way to modify or even to replace these external

6 Of course, we do not necessarily need to maintain our own Web server in order to publish Web pages on the
Internet. We can choose to subscribe to an ISP or other vendors that maintain Web servers for their clients.
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applications, the server machine can be potentially compromised.

For this reason, the machine

running the server should never be trusted and by no means should it be placed on the internal
network.

Also, internal users should not be allowed to run their own W eb servers for outside

access— such efforts can be nullified by using packet filtering.
Using Web pages to allow customers to buy products and services over the Internet is a bit
tricky. If on-line marketing is also intended, then die protection of the confidentiality of user data
(such as credit card numbers) becomes a critical issue. This requires secure connection between a
clients and the server. In this case, we need to maintain or purchase a secure W eb server that can
provide cryptographic protection of data and authentication of users.

Some commercial W eb

servers offer high levels of authentication by user ID and by source IP address.

For instance,

N etscape’s Secure Commerce W eb server has embedded digital user authentication and
cryptographic protection of data. One of the leading secure W eb protocols is the Secure HTTP.
Essentially, S-HTTP is a variation of HTTP.
Hence, to secure a W eb server, we propose the following policies:
1) Deny external users access to internally maintained HTTP servers.
2)

The machine that is running the server should never be trusted. The server m ust be configured
carefully so that it only can access the data we want to make public.

3)

W rite and use only secure scripts on the server.

To enforce the above policies, we propose the following solutions:
1) W e can use packet filtering to deny external users to access internal W eb servers in case any
unauthorized internal servers are accessed by hackers (see Table 11). If a user sets up a server
using a port above 1023, outside access to it will be denied by default.
2)

Run the server in a restricted environment. Give the server as few privileges as possible. The
server will have to be started using the root privilege, but after the server is up, we should
change the user ID so it has only the privileges needed to run the server. Since we are also
doing on-line marketing using the same server, sensitive user data must not be saved on the
same machine.

3)

Require that experienced secure script writers review all the scripts to be placed on the server.
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5.3 Which Firewall Architecture to Choose?
We have discussed the security concerns about services we want to use on the Internet and to
provide to the Internet community.

We also have covered very briefly services needed to be

provided to employees physically working outside the company or traveling on the road, such as
the inbound user-oriented FTP service and inbound remote access service. These are difficult to
secure using general firewall techniques.
In order to safely provide e-mail service, we will need to maintain a pair of mail servers. We
will maintain an intermediate secure SM TP server in the perimeter network so incoming e-mail
messages can be directed first to this server. Using a bare-bone screening router architecture is out
of the question. Using a dual-homed host architecture will bring us too many inconvenience for
protocols that can be secured using packet filtering. Using a screened host architecture is feasible
for e-mail services, however, this architecture is too dangerous to be considered because the
defense is only single-line. This leaves us the screened subnet firewall architecture. Better yet, we
will use the multiple-bastion-hosts variation of the screened subnet architecture so the servers in
the DMZ can be run on dedicated machines (Figure 8).
To support internal W eb clients, we do not really need a screened subnet architecture. It is
acceptable to use a screened host architecture since we can run proxy servers in the internal bastion
host in order to use external services which are not using standard ports, and rely on packet
filtering to use external services which are using standard ports.

However, to publish our Web

pages, it is unacceptable to run the W eb server in a internal bastion host. W e will have to choose
an architecture similar to the screened subnet architecture so the server can be maintained in the
DM Z which is some distance away from the internal system. On-line marketing requires us to run
a secure version of HTTP server. This architecture also allow internal users to access our own
Web servers. Again, the server will be run on a dedicated bastion host.
H ie same is true when it comes to anonymous file transferring service. If we also want to
offer user-oriented file transferring service through the firewall, we have to run a secure file
transferring server, such as the W U FTP server, so external hosts can be strictly authenticated and
data is properly encrypted.
For remote access servers and user-oriented file transferring service, a feasible alternative is
to use non-firewall security measures such as a remote access server that supports call-back dial
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up, strict authentication, and strong data encryption. The servers need to be maintained internally
(Figure 8). W e can also use internal firewalls so the more sensitive internal network segments are
separated from those less sensitive ones.
The screened subnet architecture provides us multilayer defense and great flexibility on how
to secure inbound and outbound services.
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6. SUMMARY
Today’s network technologies offer us lots of freedom to send and receive data across
networks to allow communication and resource sharing. However, network usage also brings us
many potential security risks. To minimize the disruption caused by intentional and unintentional
intrusions into an internal network, various measures have to be taken to ensure the security of
information and network resources.
Security management covers a lot of areas, such as security-related planning, policies,
standards and procedures, documentation, testing, monitoring, maintenance, incident response,
physical protection, personnel management, and so on (Garfmkel and Spafford, 1996).

Many

tilings, social and technical, have to be done in order to secure a network system. Some authors
(Lynch and Rose, 1993) categorize network security into architectural security and operational
security to distinguish its different aspects. Whatever the taxonomy, we should realize that only
focusing on one or merely a few aspects of network security can not ensure that a network can be
reasonably secured.
Firewalls are part of a good “defense in depth” strategy, but they are only one of the many
layers needed to secure an internal network. They must be used “in addition to” and not “instead
o f ’ other security measures
There are also many levels of network security.

We can choose to do nothing and rely on

whatever the system vendor has provided us. W e can also choose to let insiders have some but
incomplete knowledge about the system— security through obscurity.

We can opt to achieve

security by making sure that every host in the system is secure, but this works only when we have a
limited number of hosts. Systems such as Kerberos, Secure RPC, ssh, and Secure IP can be used
to secure the communication between a set of hosts in a hostile environment.

Host security is

always an essential part for the overall security of a site for defending against various forms of
attacks, internal or external. However, when we have a network that have dozens of hosts, security
at the host level will not be enough and maintaining a high level of host security for each individual
host requires close cooperation of users and is too costly. In this situation, we need security at the
network level.
Firewalls can provide security for a network of hosts. A firewall offers a relatively low-cost
and high-quality way to fight against most threats that come from outside network systems.
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Traditional firewall approaches include packet filtering, proxy services, and circuit-level gateways.
Advanced firewall techniques such as the stateful multilayer inspection are also gaining industrial
strength. There are various firewall architectures we can use to put the components needed to
implements our security needs.

Commonly used architectures include the screening router

architecture, the dual-homed bastion host architecture, the screened host architecture, and the
screened subnet architecture. Each firewall architecture has its own built-in security philosophy to
meet certain types of security needs.
A number of enhanced features have been made available in some commercial firewall
products in recent years. Stateful multilayer inspection is an advanced and dynamic form of packet
filtering, which eliminates the need for separate proxy servers for services that need to be secured.
Firewall-monitoring functions in integrated enterprise-management platforms let administrators to
perform tasks from a single, local or remote, console (Shell, 1997).

Automatic management

response to firewall alarms is also a welcome feature. M ost of these products also support userfriendly GUI that makes once tedious firewall configuration work a lot more easier than it was ever
before.
Building and maintaining firewalls is a ongoing process; policy has to be enforced and the
system should be frequently maintained. Firewall maintenance requires security personnel possess
a good knowledge in computer hardware and software, how operating systems and networks work,
and understand the historical context of current technologies involved, and deep understanding of
information protection issues.
If potential losses are of high value, the security posture assessment is also necessary as part
of the security enforcement.

This includes surveying different work groups by security

administrators, writing up survey documentation and analyze the result, and updating security
plans/policies.
In order to apply the material that has been reviewed in this paper, we have made a few
assumptions so we can build a firewall on our own to secure the needed services. It is important to
point out that the build-your-own strategy presented here allows system administrators to
understand firewalls better, however, support and maintenance is definitely a long-term concern.
On the other hand, as commercial firewall products become more affordable and more
reliable, many organizations are trying to catch up with the “firewall rush” . It is important to note
that commercial firewall products are not the ultimate solution to the issues of information and
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resource protection, although they can help us a great deal— as Cohen (1995) has pointed out:
“protection is something you do, not something you buy.”

APPENDIX: FIREWALL PRODUCTS

Cern WWW Service
Developed in the birthplace of the World-Wide Web, the European Laboratory for Practice Physics,
Switzerland, the Cern WWW is one of the few commonly used HTTP servers on the Internet. It can be
configured to run in proxy mode in which the Cern server works pretty much the same way as the TIS
FWTK. It requires tire modification of proxy clients in many cases, but it provides a more transparent
service than TIS FWTK. The performance of Cern WWW server when used as a proxy server is also
better than TIS FWTK because it has a data-cache feature.
List Price:

Freeware

Web Site:

FTP//www.w3.org

Checkpoint Firewall-1
Supports dynamic packet filtering (stateful multilayer inspection). The innovative design allows the
product to support almost all services. In the case of FTP, it monitors commands sent over the FTP
command channel and notices the PORT command the client sends to the server. It will allow the server
to open die data channel but applies a dme-out limit, although hackers might use this “time-out” window
to mount an attack. According to the evaluations done by Snyder (1997) and Carreon et al (1996), diis
product offers an excellent transparent path between the internal and external systems and a very friendly
configuration GUI.
List Price:

$18,900

Web Site.

?

Cisco Systems Routers
Routers made by the Cisco Systems, Inc. are widely used by many organizations today to connect to
die Internet.
capabilities.

The products are considered high performance routers with good packet filtering
The routers run a very complicated real-time operating system called the Internetwork

Operating System (IOS) which is tailored to perform high speed routing and packet filtering. The
products provide a relatively easy configuration interface.
List Price:

?

Web Site:

?

Gauntlet Internet Firewall
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Possibly the best firewall product on the market so far (Carreon et al, 1996), this commercial product
offers both text-based menus and a Web-based GUI. It allows no direct access to the internal system and
support a slew of authentication schemes.

However, for some reason the package does not support

SOCKS-based clients.
List Price:

$15,000

Web Site:

?

ON Guard Firewall
The ON Guard Firewall is a dedicated, Intel-based PC with a proprietary operating system that is
administrated using the ON Guard Manager software. It supports stateful multilayer inspection. The
firewall provides a GUI configuration called Master Security Plan (MSP) that protects an internal system
by controlling inbound and outbound traffic that passes the firewall. User services can be “enabled” or
“disabled” using the MSP. As a commercial firewall producer, ON guard offers little technical details
about its products.
List Price;

Unknown

Web Site:

http://www.on.com

Socks
The original version of SOCKS consists of two major parts: client libraries and a generic server.
The package is usually used on a dual-homed host to provide proxy services for FTP, Telnet, finger, and
whois, etc.

SOCKS client libraries are supported in platforms such as UNIX, MS Windows, and

Macintosh, which consist of a set of standard socket library calls, such as connec(), bind(), listen(), and
accept(). The server supports only UNIX systems, but is accessible by clients running on any supported
platforms.
The latest version of SOCKS, SOCKS 5.0, has become a recognized standard for proxy systems.
SOCKS 5.0 works at the transport layer and allows users to set up circuit-level gateways between a user
and a protected system, thus it is more flexible than application-level proxy servers. SOCKS 5.0 also
provides strong authentication and encryption features, thus it is suitable for providing services such as
on-line marketing or remote network access.
List Price:

Freeware

Web Site:

ftp://ftp.nec.com

TIS FWTK
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The TIS Firewall Toolkit usually runs on a dual-homed host, which contains a variety of useful tools
and proxy services that can help to secure a LAN from external threats. The application contains a lile
called netacl which specifies access information and works in conjunction with inetd; thus it can help
control services supported by inetd (such as ftpd and httpd).

It also provides a secured mail application

(smap and smapd) which handles basic e-mail functions in a secure fashion, and an FTP daemon that
enables one to run anonymous FTP server inside a firewall. Proxy servers provided by TIS FWTK include
ftp-gw, plug-gw (for socket-to-socket service), and tn-gw (for Telnet service). These proxy servers do not
require client user interface be modified.
List Price:

Freeware

Web Site:

ftp://ftp.tis.com

WU FTP
Developed in the Washington University (WU) in St. Louis, WU FTP is very suitable for providing a
secure version of user-oriented FTP service. The protocol provides a few security features, including
control user access based on group ID, sophisticated logging functions for uploads and downloads, and
automatic service shutdown. WU FTP is also very suitable for handling large archives.
List Price:

Freeware

Web Site:

ftp://wuarchive.wustl.edu
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